Now for our specialty - the psychological context.  Keep in mind that excessive fear is paranoia, and paranoia is one of the most powerful types of fears, bolstered by one's own feeling of isolation and often leading to self-destruction (e.g., Othello).  Paranoia is present to varying degrees in most people - given that 15% of prehistoric humans met a violent death at the hands of another human, paranoia was an adaptive trait on an individual level.  As strange as it may sound, through the emotional defense mechanism of projective identification the paranoid often induce others to treat them harshly or suspiciously.  Yet on a population level, group paranoia often leads to irrationality and atrocities against the feared others through this same process of projective identification.

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The Iranian revolution of 1979 overthrew a British and American "stooge" - a monarchy placed in power by the CIA and MI6 in 1953 by overthrowing a democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister.  Iranians rightfully see themselves as past victims of American meddling, and the regime does not trust the U.S., Israel, or Britain.  Iranian propagandists go so far as to portray Israelis, British, and Americans as sub-human, referring to them as "dogs" and "infidels."  Is the Iranian leadership paranoid about U.S. and Israeli intentions?  From our perspective, of course.  Might their paranoia drive them to develop the very nuclear bomb we are paranoid about them possessing?  Yes, definitely, wouldn't you want maximum deterrence against a proven enemy too?

See the image above of a mural from outside the former American embassy in Tehran.  One of the requirements in paranoid terrorist psychology is to dehumanize the opponent, so normal human empathy is turned off.  Predictor of action:  If you don't see another as human, you can hurt them with no sense of remorse (in fact, you feel righteous to do so because you are protecting your group).

Yet Israelis see an Iranian nuclear weapon as an existential threat (and the Iranian leadership has said as much).  Given Israel's history of near-annihilation on multiple occasions (not irrational paranoia), the military is not relaxed about this threat.  Predictor of action:  When backed into a corner, no option is off the table. 

In a startling twist of fate, the father of Game Theory involving multiple equilibria in noncooperative games was John Nash, subject of the Academy Award-winning move A Beautiful Mind.  Nash is a mathematical genius who won the 1994 Nobel Prize in Economics for his contributions to the field.  However, in his early 20s he developed paranoid schizophrenia and spent many years in institutions. 

During the U.S. debt ceiling stalement in July 2011, University of Washington Professor David P. Barash wrote an op-ed in the New York Times explaining the game theory behind the show-down over raising the debt ceiling.  Many of his examples are illustrative of what the West is facing with Iran.

Dr, Barash explains that by playing chicken (as the Tea-partiers appeared to be doing over the debt ceiling talks) low-power players can extract additional concessions due to their "hardliner" stance.  As he puts it, "The trick to winning is for one player to convince the other that under no circumstance will he or she veer off course."  Dr. Barash continues, "Another tactic, favored by the strategist Herman Kahn, is to "throw out the steering wheel," to demonstrate that you are locked into a certain path and can't swerve. "

In such cases of playing chicken, it is best to convince your opponent that either 1) you have no alternative course of action and so CANNOT compromise ("my constituents won't let me back down"), or 2) you are stone-cold crazy and could care less about the consequences to yourself ("I will take you down with me if that's how it has to be!").  Both of these strategies increase the negotiating power of a lesser player, but they also presume a rational analysis of the situation by that player.  Sometimes your opponent truly is suicide-bomber-crazy, and you will always lose when playing chicken with such an opponent (as will they, but they won't care). 

The strategy Dr. Barash concludes with is the following:  "In either case, whether you're confronting a rogue elephant or a rogue nuclear state, the advice is the same: stop playing the game. Avoid the elephant or shoot it; politically isolate the rogue state or use military force to disarm it."

So how do you know whether your opponent is strategically crazy as in the first two cases or crazy-crazy like a suicide bomber? (See Dr. Barash's article or book to learn more).  In the case of Iran, the key question is, is the leadership acting strategically to increase their bargaining power, increase their esteem among their own people, and perhaps even earn the international perks and payoffs that North Korea (food aid, energy shipments) and Pakistan (military "aid" and free cash) have earned?  This seems plausible enough, but before moving on, we need to determine if the leadership of Iran is truly crazy.

Aside from a perhaps justified paranoia about foreign invasion, Ayatollah Khamenei and the Iranian leadership has excellent hygiene and don't apparently speak to themselves in public.  However, the leadership is generally comprised of lifelong religious scholars, and given the sometimes thin psychic line between communicating with Angels and believing the CIA is following you, this might actually be worrisome.  But wait, the CIA is following them.  In any case, what evidence is there for leadership insanity?  None of which I am aware, although very clever people such as Stanford's Robert Sapolsky have noted fascinating parallels.

So the first preferred strategy when dealing with such an opponent is to politically and economically isolate the country (done).  Given the history of paranoia and poor relations between Iran and the West, and the absence of a legitimate political alternative to Ayatollah Khamenei and the Grand Council, it's likely that isolation will not bring down the Iranian government.   If isolation doesn't work - and how long will we wait? - then either ignoring Iran (e.g., North Korea and Cuba) or a military assault (nuclear sites bombed by Israel in Iraq and Syria) is likely. 

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